Introduction
In this paper, we assess Rwanda's involvement in Eastern DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) from the perspective of the literature on criminal behaviour. Just like individuals, other entities, such as states, can engage in criminal activities, making choices they consider rational. How do these countries' decisions to commit crimes come about? Why and when do they lift the criminal option? And how can the so-called international community influence these decisions in a similar way as the police and the judicial system in a domestic criminal context?
1 Over the years, a large literature has emerged that tries to fit answers to these questions within a framework of rational, optimal (criminal) decision making.
Traditionally, criminal behaviour is thereby analyzed within an expected utility framework (Becker, 1968) . Within this framework, a 'criminal' is only expected to commit an offense if the expected profits exceed the expected costs. The expected profits are the gains that result from the offense. The expected costs are the result of the probability of conviction and the level of punishment (Cooter and Ulen, 2000) . Both parameters are supposed to have a deterrent effect.
As the probability of punishment increases or the severity of punishment augments, the total number of offenses will be reduced.
The calculation of this expected net-gain of a crime is similar to cost-benefit calculations in economics. For instance, it is the traditional criterion to analyze the profitability of projects in capital budgeting. The economic literature recognized the limitations of this approach only recently. In particular, traditional models cannot capture the value of flexibility to adapt an investment decision in response to uncertainty. This gave rise to a large body of new literature, and a new class of models usually referred to as 'real options' models. Real option theory 1 We use the expression "so-called", because the "international community" does not really exist. Is it its institutional translation, namely the United Nations? Or does it refer to specific countries with a particular interest in a given situation or the press or vocal NGOs attempting to influence international public opinion? The international community is all of the above, and the notion lacks clarity and allows the actors to escape their responsibilities. However, after this caveat, the expression will be used throughout this article.
combines the simultaneous existence of uncertainty, irreversibility of investment and some freedom on the timing of the investment. In this way, a more dynamic framework to evaluate investment projects has emerged. For instance, postponing an investment project to take a better informed decision in a turbulent environment avoids being trapped in an irreversible loss-making investment project. Real option models have already been applied in a variety of business contexts, such as natural resource investments, land development, flexible manufacturing, R&D and others. Engelen (2004) pioneered the application of real option reasoning to criminal behaviour, i.e.
criminal options, as a similar problem arises with respect to conventional economic analysis of criminal behaviour (see infra). We apply this criminal real option approach to the way in which Rwanda has intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1996. We study two episodes of criminal behaviour: the massive killing of Hutu refugees in late 1996 and early 1997, and the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources since 1998.
The article is organized as follows. After explaining the concept of real options in section one, an overview of the general real option framework for criminal behaviour is given in sections two and three. This model will then be applied to Rwanda's behaviour in the DRC. Section four examines this criminal option from the point of view of both Rwanda and the international community. The central question addressed here is how country-level criminal behaviour can be restricted based on the insights of a real option model. Section five describes two cases of Rwandan criminal behaviour and analyses the real options calculations of the Rwandan regime. Section six contains the conclusions.
The concept of real options
Allocating resources through investment opportunities is traditionally evaluated using a costbenefit approach. The inherent limitations of such approach are well-documented. It assumes a now-or-never decision and assumes the decision-maker to follow a rigid path once the investment decision is taken (Feinstein and Lander, 2002) . In reality, in a competitive environment with uncertainty and change, projects will not crystallize in the same shape as the decision-maker has initially envisioned. During the lifetime of the project new information might arrive or certain sources of uncertainty might be resolved, making it valuable to adjust the strategy (Trigeorgis, 2000) . The cost-benefit model cannot handle operational flexibilities such as delaying, scaling-up/down, shutting down/restarting or abandoning a project (Guerrero, 2007) . Furthermore, it cannot handle strategic dimensions of projects either (Kester, 1984) . This is the case when a project consists of different phases which are not independent of each other. Such capital budgeting decisions are better handled using a real option framework. Active real option management allows to improve the upside potential of projects, while excluding downside losses.
In general, an option can be defined as the right, but not the obligation, to buy (call-option) or sell (put-option) the underlying asset at an agreed price (strike price or exercise price) during a specific period or at a predetermined expiration date. Typical examples are stock options, index options, interest rate options, currency options or options on commodities. Having the flexibility to exercise such a financial option clearly has value in financial markets. In contrast with financial options, real options refer to the application of the options concept to physical investment opportunities. Any investment project can be viewed as an option whereby the firm has the right to obtain all the underlying cash flows from the investment project at a known price. This price is the investment cost of the project and is analogous to the exercise price in financial options. When the firm decides to go along with the investment project, it executes the option.
Within this context, these kinds of options are conventionally labelled as real options.
Different theoretical types of real options have been developed in the early literature: options to delay (McDonald and Siegel, 1986) , scale options (Trigeorgis and Mason, 1987) , options to abandon (Myers and Majd, 1990) , switch options (Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis, 1994) , growth options (Amran and Kulatilaka, 1999) and sequential options (Carr, 1988) . The later literature applied real option models to investment decisions in different sectors, such as natural resources (Paddock et al, 1988) , internet companies (Schwartz and Moon, 2000) , the service sector (Jensen and Warren, 2001) , the entertainment industry (Amran, 2003) , pharmaceutical R&D (Cassimon et al, 2011a) and mobile payment systems (Cassimon et al, 2011b) .
Modelling criminal behaviour
In this section we compare the conventional cost-benefit approach of criminal behaviour (section 2.1) with the real option approach to crime (section 2.2).
Criminal behaviour within an expected utility framework
According to the classic economic theory of crime and punishment, criminal behaviour is analyzed within an expected utility framework (Posner, 1998) . Within this framework, the total number of offenses in a society will be influenced by the probability of punishment represented by parameter p and the severity of punishment represented by parameter f (Becker, 1968) . As the probability of punishment increases or the severity of punishment augments (p or f increase), the total number of offenses in society will be reduced.
A person is only expected to commit an offense if the expected profits exceed the expected costs.
The expected profits are the gains (Y) that result from the offense. The expected costs are the result of the probability of conviction p and the level of punishment f. Put simply, the expected net-gain is thus Y -p.f. 2 This conventional decision rule is very simple:
This traditional calculation of the expected net-gain is therefore a now-or-never decision. One could argue that criminals continually update their analysis whether to commit a crime or not, but this is in fact an implicit application of option thinking, which falls outside the scope of the traditional models. Engelen (2004) shows that the conventional approach ignores the aspect of uncertainty, which may ultimately lead to the crime becoming profitable. Indeed, the conventional approach cannot deal with the simultaneous existence of uncertainty, irreversibility of the criminal act and flexibility in the timing when to commit the crime. Combining irreversibility with uncertainty over the future behaviour of variables affecting the value of the crime leads to the following intuitive reasoning. Suppose there is some leeway in delaying the crime until more information about the uncertain future becomes available. It may then be optimal to wait some time before committing the crime. It is clear that waiting to commit the crime implies risks (e.g. entry of other criminals) and foregone profits, but it may prevent the criminal from being trapped in an irreversible crime, which may turn out to be very costly when the adverse future materializes (when being caught).
2 More formally, a criminal will maximize the following expected utility function (Becker, 1968) :
, with EU expected utility, p the probability of punishment, U the criminal's utility function, f the severity of punishment, Y the income if undetected, and Y-f the income if punished.
Criminal behaviour as a real option
A crime that satisfies these three characteristics (uncertainty, irreversibility of the criminal act and timing flexibility) is best treated as analogous to holding a financial call-option. For some specific time period, a criminal has the possibility, but not the obligation, to pay a certain 'price' in return for an asset that has some value. When the criminal decision is made, the option is exercised, and that is an irreversible decision. As long as the benefits from the crime are smaller than the costs of the crime, the criminal will not exercise his criminal option. Once the benefits of the crime exceed the costs of the crime, a criminal can consider exercising the criminal option and thus committing the crime.
Two scenarios are possible. First, the criminal has no possibility to delay his decision. In that case, it is a now or never decision. If the net expected benefits are positive, he will commit the crime, in the other case, he will abstain from it. Second, there is some flexibility in the timing of 3 If there is no opportunity cost of waiting, the criminal will not commit the crime before its time to expiration. 4 Only if the criminal faces an opportunity cost by waiting, early exercise is a feasible strategy. Early exercise therefore depends on the trade-off between losing the time value (flexibility) and the amount of the opportunity cost (δ) (see infra).
Analogously to conventional option models we can map the different value drivers of a criminal option model. Table 1 provides a synthetic overview of the different determinants of the value of the option, together with its expected impact on the option value. For instance, the expected benefits of the crime, the volatility of the return, the lifetime of the option have a positive impact on the option value, while the severity of punishment and the probability of punishment have a negative impact on the option value. Appendix 1 presents a more technical presentation of the conventional Black-Scholes (1973) formula and its components. 5 The appendix also includes the actual formulas how to determine changes in the value of the criminal call-option as a reaction to the change in one of the underlying variables (the first derivatives). 
<0

Volatility of the benefit of the crime >0
Lifetime of the criminal option T-t >0
Risk-free interest rate r c >0
Opportunity cost <0
The Optimal Timing of a Crime
One of the consequences of viewing the criminal decision as exercising an option is the problem when to commit a crime. This can be illustrated most simply by referring to the conventional economic analysis of crime: the direct payoff from committing the crime now is given by Y-p.f.
When this payoff is positive (Y-p.f > 0), it is worthwhile to commit the crime. However, once the crime is committed, the flexibility is gone. Therefore, we can apply the general category of options to delay to this criminal option to analyze this situation. Should the criminal commit the crime now or wait until more information is available so that his criminal decision can be made under less uncertainty? For, by committing the crime, the option expires. So, the value of the option today (C 0 ) must be compared with the payoff of committing the crime immediately.
Hence the optimal crime criterion is modified into: In option pricing jargon, the option is said to be 'out of the money' in the case of 'waiting' and 'in the money' when the underlying value of the crime (Y) exceeds the option value plus the cost of the crime. As such, the basic criminal decision to take is not whether or not to commit the crime (as indicated by the conventional economic analysis of crime), but rather when to commit the crime, i.e. determining the optimal moment of exercising the criminal option. 
This intuitive reasoning is graphically represented in Figure 1 . The linear curve shows the conventional cost benefit approach to crimes, being the Y-p.f payoff. According to this rule the crime will be committed when the underlying value (Y) is at least the value indicated by point (a)
in Figure 1 . When it is lower, the criminal will refrain from committing the crime. However, under the real option approach, the decision criterion changes. Even when the value of Y is larger than point (a), it can be optimal to wait. The criminal will only commit the crime now, meaning executing his criminal option, when the net benefit is sufficiently positive to compensate the value of keeping the option alive, as represented by the option value curve C 0 , in other words, from point (b) on. From that moment on, it is no longer optimal to wait any longer:
committing the crime now provides the criminal with a higher anticipated pay-off than that of waiting any longer.
Changes of the different value drivers will have an impact on the optimal timing of executing the criminal option, as shown in Figure 1 . First of all, as Figure 1 is expressed in terms of Y, an increase in the benefits of the crime (Y) means a shift rightward on both curves, which increased chances of execution being the optimal decision. Second, an increase in the level of punishment (f) or in the probability of conviction (p), implying an increased cost of the crime, will result in a right downward shift of both curves, resulting in a shift of points (a) As a consequence, it is important for the criminal to try to influence the parameters that determine his decision making to his/her advantage by means of a pro-active management of the criminal option. On the other hand, it shows a range of possibilities by prosecutors or the international community to engage in actions that reduce the pay-off for the criminal, not only by playing on the conventional cost-benefit determinants of a crime, but also by influencing the additional determinants identified in the criminal option framework.
Pro-active management by the criminal state and the international community
The previous sections showed that analyzing crimes through real options models offers a richer framework which takes into account the flexibility the criminal has to commit the crime at an optimal moment in the future. Once a criminal holds a criminal option, he can actively increase its value as long as the option does not mature. He can develop specific strategies with respect to one or more of the value drivers of the criminal option in order to increase the upside potential of the crime, while always being able to cut-off the downside loss. On the other side, the prosecutor can develop strategies to decrease the criminal option value. This section applies this model to pro-active management in general terms, both from the point of view of a criminal state and from the viewpoint of the international community. Section five will offer two concrete illustrations. Table 2 provides an overview of actions, both by the criminal state (column three) and the international community (last column), in order to pro-actively influence the pay-offs of the criminal option and the value of the option. By affecting the values of the underlying variables (value-drivers) the decision of the criminal state will be influenced. In column two, we first provide a number of concrete examples of these value drivers of criminal action. 
(Pro-)active management by the criminal state
If a state uses a criminal option model to determine whether (or when) to take a certain action, this approach can have major implications for the enforcement policy. Instead of passively monitoring the criminal option, an active management of the six value-drivers can increase the option value. In order to maximize the criminal option value, the criminal state can pursue different strategies (see Table 2 ): 6 -Lever 1: Concrete examples of the benefits of the crime can be the extension of territory, access to additional (natural) resources, or aversion of a threat. In order to increase the expected proceeds, the criminal state can try to increase this rate of extension, or the amount of additional resources, possibly by engaging in strategic alliances with other (potential criminal) states, or by combining different types of benefits.
-Lever 2: Concrete examples of the cost of a crime can be political or financial costs, judicial condemnation or the costs of occupation. To decrease the cost, criminal states can try to engage in actions decreasing the probability of punishment (p) or decreasing the level of punishment (f). Examples include finding strategic alliances, trying to exploit loopholes in international law by seeking expert judicial council on this, trying to divide the international community, or by seeking up-front clearance for the act from key international players.
-Lever 3: Uncertainty about the rate of resistance to invasion, or uncertainty about the value of additional resources reaped, are examples of the volatility surrounding the rate of return.
Criminal states can try to influence this by seeking support (strategic alliances), or by considering new (criminal) options that arise once the first option is lifted (so-called growth options).
-Lever 4: The criminal state can try to increase the lifetime of the option, by keeping options open as long as possible; and -Lever 5: The criminal state can try to decrease the opportunity cost, i.e. value lost by waiting to commit the crime. Typical examples here are the additional resources foregone as long as the crime did not take place, or the continuation of a threat. Ways by which the criminal state can try to limit this is by seeking alliances, by eliminating potential competitors that might also be interested in committing the same crime, or in case of a threat, by trying to reduce it.
Each of the above strategies will be illustrated by concrete examples in section five.
The point of view of the international community
A thorough examination of the sensitivity of the different value-drivers of a criminal option is also important in order to establish an adequate international enforcement policy. Once the most valuable parameters of a particular kind of criminal option are identified, the enforcement policy can occur more efficiently by focusing on these parameters. -Lever 2: To increase the cost, by increasing the probability of punishment (p) or an increase of the level of punishment (f). This can be by severe sanctions, or the threat to withdraw political and financial support (aid, etc.). Another example is the improved working and jurisprudence of international courts and other international judicial mechanisms. Instruments also include individual prosecutions before the International Criminal Court (ICC).
-Lever 3: To decrease the volatility and uncertainty surrounding the return of the crime, by showing unanimous resolve (e.g. among permanent members of the UN Security Council).
-Lever 4: To reduce the lifetime of the option, by intervening early.
-Lever 5: To increase the opportunity cost, i.e. value lost by waiting to commit the crime, by supporting the victim state or the aggressor's adversaries.
Apart from political condemnations, the international community has two (potentially) powerful instruments at its disposal. 
The massacre of refugees
Criminal activity
Although the Rwandan civil war formally ended with the victory of the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) in July 1994, the flight to (then) Zaire of the defeated army, the militia and over one million civilians exported the conflict. As these insurgent forces were intent on resuming the war, the situation that developed just a few kilometres across its borders was Rwanda's affair, and a vital one at that. Already in 1995, Kagame told journalist François
Misser that "if another war must be waged, we shall fight in a different fashion, elsewhere.
We are prepared. We are ready to fight any war. And we shall contain it along the border with Zaire" (Misser, 1995: 121) . Officials from the US and The Netherlands, two countries close to the new Rwandan regime, confirmed that they had to dissuade Kagame on several occasions from "breaking the abscess" of the Rwandan refugees in Zaire the hard way 9 . During a visit to the US in August 1996, a month before the start of the "rebellion" engineered by Kigali, Kagame told the Americans that he was about to intervene 10 , the more so since, according to some sources 11 , the ex-FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises) were preparing a large-scale offensive against Rwanda from Goma and Bukavu. Faced with the obvious unwillingness or inability of the international community to tackle this problem, Kigali's patience had reached its limits.
From October 1996 onwards, the RPA systematically attacked the refugee camps, first under the guise of the so-called "Banyamulenge rebellion" and later hiding behind a proxy rebel movement, the AFDL, which was created in Kigali (for details, see Reyntjens, 2009 proven, point to circumstances and facts which in a court could infer the intention to destroy 10 According to the then U.S. Ambassador to Kigali Robert Gribbin, already in March 1996 Kagame told him that "if Zaire continues to support the ex-FAR/Interahamwe against Rwanda, Rwanda in turn could find antiMobutu elements to support", adding that "if the international community could not help improve security in the region, the RPA might be compelled to act alone" (Gribbin, 2005: 144-145) . 11 The existence of this project was later confirmed by documents discovered in November 1996 in Mugunga refugee camp, where many ex-FAR had regrouped.
the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in part" (United Nations High Commission for Human
Rights 2010: para 31), a reference to the genocide convention.
The real options calculation
Benefits of the crime
The operation conducted by the RPA in Zaire allowed Rwanda to eliminate the actual threat posed by the presence of armed elements across its border. In a second stage, the extermination of as many Hutu refugees as possible was, in part, a retaliation for the genocide of Tutsi in 1994 and, in part, the elimination of a potential future threat. The second stage was an option opened by exercising the first criminal option.
Costs of the crime
These were fourfold. The direct financial cost was limited. The RPA initially operated close to its own bases, and it was essentially infantry-based, with soldiers mostly moving on foot.
Logistics and communication needs were covered free of charge by the US (Reyntjens, 2009: 66-79) . Rwanda learned in 1996-1997 that waging war in Congo was cheap, and even profitable, and this was later to lead to another war, motivated by plunder rather than by security concerns (see infra).
The second cost related to international law. The operation in Zaire was indeed a clear violation of that country's territorial integrity. This is why it was conducted under the guise of a domestic "rebellion" and why Rwanda consistently denied having troops in Zaire, despite all indications to the contrary. When, on 29 January 1997, Belgium stated publicly what everyone knew, namely that thousands of Rwandan soldiers fought alongside the rebellion, this met with an acid rebuttal. Claude Dusaidi, advisor at the Rwandan presidency, immediately stated: "I believe that Belgium has gone senile (…). It looks like they don't know where the borders are, nor do they distinguish between Zaireans and Rwandans" (AFP, Nairobi, 29 January 1997). The next day, the Rwandan Foreign Minister called the Belgian accusations "erroneous and partisan" (AFP, Nairobi, 30 January 1997). Only after the war did Kagame himself unveil the public secret in an interview with The Washington Post of 9 July 1997 (Pomfret, 1997) . He said that "the Rwandan Government planned and directed the rebellion", that "Rwandan forces participated in the capture of at least four cities" and that "Rwanda provided training and arms for (the rebel) forces even before the campaign to overthrow Marshal Mobutu began last October".
By acting so blatantly in violation of international law, Rwanda took the risk of a political and a legal cost. The potential political cost was international condemnation by both individual states and by the UN Security Council. However, it felt -rightly as it turned out-that it was sufficiently covered by the great powers, and by the US in particular. As seen earlier, the US The third risk concerned the fallout of the massacre of refugees committed by the RPA in Zaire/Congo. We have seen earlier that a UN investigative team (and indeed many other sources) established that crimes against humanity and war crimes, and possibly genocide, were perpetrated at a massive scale. Although these crimes are imprescriptible, the ICC was not competent at the time they were committed, and the Rwandans could therefore hope that they would remain unpunished. However, they only narrowly escaped, at least for the time being. Indeed, on 13 July 1998, the Security Council condemned the crimes and requested the Congolese and Rwandan governments to run inquiries and punish the guilty. By demanding a report on the steps taken by 15 October at the latest, the Council kept its options open, as it envisaged, if need be, to take the "additional measures" necessary to judge the culprits.
Without saying so explicitly, it thus left the possibility to take them before an international tribunal, an option suggested by the report of inquiry. However, 15 October was to pass 12 U.S. Ambassador in Kigali Gribbin believes that Kagame's August 1996 visit to Washington ended in a misunderstanding: "Kagame judged that he was honest about Rwanda's intent to dismantle the camps in the absence of an international undertaking to do so. In turn Secretary of Defense William Perry thought he laid down a clear marker that unilateral action was not advisable. Kagame thought he got an okay. Perry thought he had quashed the idea. Each went away happy" (Gribbin, 2005: 175-176) . 13 As we shall see later, it (unsuccessfully) did during the second war.
without the issue returning to the agenda, and it has not done so since. The fourth potential cost was linked to risks two and three. Rwanda is one of the most aiddependent countries in the world 16 , and it could ill afford to lose (part of) the incoming ODA as a result of donors scaling down their aid in reaction to the aggression. However, Rwanda was very well covered by the US, as seen before, but also by the UK and The Netherlands, operation Lynda Chalker and her successor Clare Short explicitly endorsed Rwanda's geopolitical behaviour. Therefore, the risk of sanctions was very limited, and they did not materialise at the time (however, they did later, see infra).
14 The report does not just point an accusing finger at Rwanda, but at other players (such as the armies of the DRC, Angola and Uganda, and nonstate armed groups) as well. However, the crimes committed by the Rwandan army were the most serious and widespread. 15 Thus, for example, did The Washington Post of 3 October 2008 carry a story about the support of the US for the renewal of the contract of one of the indicted officers as deputy commander of the peacekeeping force in Darfur. The article argues that this support was in breach of US legislation outlawing "assistance to human rights violators". The executive director of Human Rights Watch is quoted as stating that the US position prevents "any effort to hold a senior Rwandan officer accountable for serious atrocities". Obviously, for Washington this sort of debate raises the issue of the political price it is willing to pay for its support for the Kigali regime. 16 During the period 2003-2008 period, on average ODA amounted to 26% of GDP and slightly more than 50% of the state budget. Of total ODA, budget support type of aid interventions (sector and general budget support as well as HIPC debt relief funds) amounted to slightly more that 40% on average. For details, see ODI/Mokoro (2009, p. 13-14) .
Uncertainty of the illegal return
As soon as it was clear (i) that the international community was not intent on acting credibly against the threat emanating from the refugee camps and (ii) that the cost of acting was limited, the benefit of lifting the criminal option was quite secure. One uncertainty of aggressing a neighbour to be taken into account would usually be the reaction of that country's army, and the ensuing risk of defeat and casualties in the invader's ranks. However,
the Rwandans knew what everyone knew, i.e. that the Zairian army was the mirror of a collapsed state, and that it was no match for the Rwandan army, one of the most effective in the region. This reckoning proved right, as the Zairian army put up virtually no resistance, and the only fighting forces the RPA was confronted with was the former Rwandan government army FAR. The RPA had defeated the FAR in 1994, and it could be confident that it would do so again, which it did.
Opportunity cost of not acting
The threats posed by the insurgent forces across the border increased throughout 1995-96. In particular the three western préfectures were affected by commando operations that came, at least in part, from Zairian territory. By mid-1996, the former FAR appeared to be preparing a large-scale offensive against Rwanda from their camps near Bukavu and Goma. For the Rwandan regime it was vital to keep the threat outside its borders and to avoid the civil war from resuming on its own territory. It had become clear at the same time that the international community was unwilling to address this security issue, and that the US was going to look the other way in case of a Rwandan attack. In other words, while Kagame had expressed increasing concern over the last year, he could ill afford to wait much longer. At any rate, he had been preparing for this war, and by the summer of 1996 the instrument he had been building up -the so-called "Banyamulenge rebellion"-was in place. Everything therefore converged to convince the Rwandans that the opportunity cost of waiting any longer would be considerable. The optimal time to lift the criminal option had come.
Plunder in the DRC
Criminal activity
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On 2 August 1998, Rwanda and Uganda again invaded the DRC, and -just like during the previous war-they acted hiding behind a Congolese "rebel movement", the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie) which was put in place in Kigali. Rwanda put forward security concerns similar to the ones raised in 1996, but the main motive soon Military engagement and illegal economic activities became intimately interwoven. Indeed pillaging no longer was an unfortunate side effect of war, but economic interests rather became its prime driving force. Dietrich has drawn attention to the dangers inherent in what he calls "military commercialism", whereby a stronger state deploys the national military in a weaker neighbouring country, supporting either the sovereign power (as did Zimbabwe and Angola) or insurgents (in the cases of Rwanda and Uganda), in exchange for access to profits (Dietrich, 2001 (Dietrich, , 2002 . Under these circumstances, economic criteria invade military decision-making, for example with regard to troop deployment and areas of operation 21 . In addition, if domestic resources are scarce or cannot be illicitly mobilised as a result of the scrutiny of the international community, cross-border predatory behaviour, out of sight and/or hidden behind political and military concerns, provides an alternative resource. Finally, when control over resources has become a military objective in itself, this is a strong disincentive for troop withdrawal, simply because the "expeditionary corps" and those they support, whether rebels or governments, need each other.
Nowhere is this as clear as in the case of Rwanda, a small and very poor country with little para. 130). Marysse calculated that in 1999, the total value added of diamond, gold and coltan plundered in the DRC amounted to 6.1% of Rwanda's GDP 23 , and to 146% of its official military expenditure (Marysse, 2003: 88) . The Kigali economy, which is virtually disconnected from the Rwandan economy as a whole, was largely dependent on mineral 21 Several reports point to the direct link between the exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict. The UN Panel notes that the control of mineral-rich areas "could be seen primarily as an economic and financial objective rather than a security objective for Rwanda" (UN Security Council, 2001, para. 175); "Most of the fights between Rwandan soldiers and mai-mai have occurred in the so-called 'coltan belt'" (idem, para. 176). Under the title "Rwanda's unusual tactics", the Panel found that "attacks (by the RPA) seem to coincide with the period when coltan has been extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the maimai. Attacked, the mai-mai abandon their coltan, which is then taken away by small aircraft" (idem, para. 177). This is what Jackson calls the "economisation of conflict": a process whereby conflicts progressively reorient from their original goals (in the case of Rwanda: securing its borders) towards profit, and through which conflict actors capitalise ever increasingly on the economic opportunities that war opens up (Jackson, 2002: 528) 25 .
The Marysse (2003: 89) added that "as military spending … was limited as a condition for access to financial flows provided by the Bretton Woods institutions, … wartime plunder has helped finance the conflict". He denounced the "ostrich policy" of a number of bilateral donors and the International Financial Institutions which, by continuing to fund the invading countries (Rwanda and Uganda) in the knowledge that their aid is fungible, indirectly supported the continuation of the war. 27 The UN "Panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", also known as the "Kassem Panel", has been criticised on account of its methodology and even political bias. However, the facts mentioned in this article are established beyond North Kivu (UN Security Council, 2005: paras. 199-200) .
In the framework of our criminal real options approach, it is important to point out thatcontrary to the case of Uganda whose officers and businesspeople essentially sought personal gain in the DRC -Rwanda's involvement was mainly institutional 32 .
The real option calculation
Benefits of the crime
The figures Rwanda-controlled RCD rebel leaders acknowledged that they were sending some 100 tons of coltan to Rwanda every month (Willum 2001: 44) . Returning to a figure provided by Marysse (see supra), in 1999 the total value of diamond, gold and coltan taken from the DRC amounted to 6.1% of Rwandan GDP, i.e. 15 times the part of coffee and tea, which were previously the most important earners of export proceeds.
Costs of the crime
In the words of US Ambassador Gribbin, "Rwanda had discovered during the first war that war in Congo was relatively cheap -even profitable (…) [W] ell connected Rwandans (…) could seize opportunities (…) to accumulate wealth" (Gribbin, 2005: 282-283 33 This was a structural feature, not linked to the decline as a result of war and genocide in 1990-1994. In 1989, the year before the war started, coffee accounted for US$ 59 million out of total exports worth US$ 97 million. 34 For an analysis of these and other figures on the mineral trade, see Willum (2001: 24-60 ).
Samset, "war facilitates excessive resource exploitation, and excessive exploitation spurs continued fighting" (Samset, 2002: 477) .
However, there were potential costs other than financial ones. The considerations related to international law were the same for this invasion as for the previous one (see supra).
Although it was clear that the new "rebellion" was masterminded in Kigali, the aggression was again endorsed by the Americans: "The United States accepted Rwanda's national security rationale as legitimate. We also recognised that the RCD was a proxy, directed in many respects from Kigali" (Gribbin, 2005: 283) . A Rwandan source told Ambassador
Gribbin that "Rwanda would withdraw, once a responsible regime was installed (in Kinshasa)" (Gribbin, 2005: 279) , and Kagame himself told him that Rwanda needed to act in order "to rectify the error of putting Kabila in power" (Gribbin, 2005: 280) . The support of the U.S. was taken for granted to such an extent that Bizima Karaha, Kabila's former Foreign
Minister who joined the new "rebellion", told Gribbin: "Ambassador, we are here again for another green light" (Gribbin, 2005: 281) . In addition to the security rationale, Rwanda also justified its intervention on humanitarian grounds. This argument was well rendered at the end 
Uncertainty of the criminal return
As far as launching a new war was concerned, Rwanda assumed that this was to be a remake of the first war, with an easy victory over a weak and unmotivated DRC government army.
This proved a miscalculation, as a number of countries -most prominently Angola and Zimbabwe-intervened on the side of the Kinshasa regime, an occurrence which Rwanda did not anticipate. The result was military stalemate, political negotiations toward a political transition in the DRC, and the (official) withdrawal of the Rwandan army. The benefit sought here -the removal of the Kabila regime and its replacement by a friendlier one (cf. Rwandan statements to US ambassador Gribbin mentioned earlier)-did not materialise. Owing to its arrogance and lack of understanding of the geopolitical interests of the intervening countries, this outcome was never seriously taken into consideration in Kigali, which erroneously considered the benefit as certain.
As seen earlier, Rwanda discovered the economic potential of the occupation of eastern Congo during the first war, and it had every reason to believe that the outcome of its "exploitative business" was certain. It indeed put in place an office called "production" in the Congo desk of its External Security Organisation, which was in charge of intelligence and operations abroad. The putting into place of such a structure suggests that Rwanda knew in which economic venture it was embarking and that it anticipated a benefit it considered certain.
Opportunity cost of not acting
Although the threat emanating from the Congo was certainly less important than during the period leading to the first war, the rapidly deteriorating relations between Rwanda and the DRC convinced Kigali that it was again going to face a hostile neighbour, whose territory could be used by enemy forces. After President Kabila replaced Rwandan Colonel Kabarebe as Chief of Staff of the Congolese army on 11 July 1998, on 26 July he ordered "the Rwandan and other foreign military" to leave the country. Hardly a week later, Rwanda reinvaded the DRC. As the preparation of such a large-scale operation takes time 38 , clearly the decision had been taken well before, but the most recent Congolese decisions, seen by Rwanda as the confirmation of hostile behaviour, triggered the resolve to act at that moment. However, Rwanda could have afforded to wait and see, and to act only after violent actions against its territory took place or were clearly being prepared. As war had become inevitable anyway, it could have lifted the option at a later moment, but it decided to do so on 2 August, because there was no reason to expect the circumstances to be better during the following months.
Conclusions and policy implications
Looking at the length of time that the criminal option was open, it can be observed that Rwanda had been preparing the first war for some time, certainly as early as mid-1995. By the Summer of 1996, everything was in place for the option to be lifted. It is very likely that Kagame decided to move forward after his visit to Washington D.C. in early August 1996. He felt he got the green light at the State Department and he probably received assurances of active backing at the Pentagon. As the instrument to act was in place, and the threat he wanted to tackle had become acute, this was the right moment to lift the option.
The calculation was less clear cut when Rwanda embarked on the second invasion of the DRC. Although relations with the Kabila regime had increasingly soured, there was no immediate threat coming from the DRC. In terms of timing, Rwanda acted within days 38 Right at the beginning, it even involved a daring airborne operation in the Bas-Congo, west of Kinshasa, over 1,500 kilometres from Rwanda.
following the Congolese request that foreign troops leave the country, although it could have waited for (much) longer. The status of other value drivers of the criminal option too was much less clear than in 1996, and the military operation did not meet last time's success. Our interpretation is that, as a result of arrogance and misled by the ease with which the previous war was conducted, Rwanda was ill-informed about regional and international reactions. Had it taken its value drivers more carefully into account, it might have lifted the option later or not at all. On the other hand, Rwanda did successfully exploit Congolese resources during the second war, and got away with it, at least for the time being. However, it has probably paid a price in terms of international understanding and sympathy. suggested that Rwanda's main bilateral donor should follow suit 41 . In January 2009, Rwanda stopped supporting Nkunda, whom they arrested, and engaged in a joint operation with the Congolese army to neutralise its former ally, the CNDP. While Kigali continues up to this day to offer clandestine support to rebel movements in South Kivu, this u-turn shows that the cost of the crime had become too heavy, an assessment that prompted Rwanda to reverse the option. It also shows that the international community has the capacity to discourage criminals from executing their criminal options, a weapon that it could and should have used in the past. The publication of the UN High Commission for Human Rights Mapping report (see supra) would again offer that opportunity, not just with regard to Rwanda but to other suspects of criminal behaviour in the DRC as well.
